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Abstract
Aprincipal,whowantspricestobeaslowaspossible,contractswithagentswhowouldliketocharge
the monopoly price. The principal chooses between a Demsetz auction, which awards an exclusive con-
tract to the agent bidding the lowest price (competition for the ﬁeld) and having two agents provide the
goodunder(imperfectly)competitiveconditions(competitionintheﬁeld). Weobtainasimplesufﬁcient
condition showing unambiguously which option is best. The condition depends only on the shapes of
the surplus function of the principal and the proﬁt function of agents, and is independent of the partic-
ular duopoly game played ex post. We apply this condition to three canonical examples—procurement,
royalty contracts and dealerships—and ﬁnd that whenever marginal revenue for the ﬁnal good is de-
creasing in the quantity sold, the principal prefers a Demsetz auction. Moreover, a planner who wants to
maximize social surplus also prefers a Demsetz auction.
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Consider a principal that needs to buy a good or service and has two procurement alternatives.
On the one hand, it can award an exclusive contract to the agent offering the lowest price, as in
a standard Demsetz (1968) auction. In this case, there will be intense ex ante price competition
(‘competition for the ﬁeld’), but in the aftermath, the agent will always charge the maximum
price allowed by the contract. The other option is to award two independent supply contracts
and rely on ex post competition (‘competition in the ﬁeld’). Then agents will consider the prob-
abilities of different ex post duopoly games when negotiating their contracts. If they anticipate
that with high probability there will be intense price competition, they will participate only if
they obtain high proﬁts in the rare cases in which they collude. Thus, the prospect of intense
competition in the ﬁeld softens competition for the ﬁeld.2 This motivates the question we ad-
dress in this paper: Should the principal contract with one or two agents?
The answer does not seem straightforward. A basic difﬁculty is that the appropriate speciﬁ-
cation of the ex post duopoly game depends on particular aspects of the situation.3 Moreover,
many duopoly games have multiple equilibria and there are no a priori compelling reasons to
choose one over another. Nevertheless, in this paper we obtain a simple sufﬁcient condition
that shows unambiguously which option is better. This condition depends only on the shapes
of the surplus function of the principal and the proﬁt function of each agent, and is indepen-
dent of the duopoly game played ex post. We then apply this condition to study three canonical
examples—procurement, royalty contracts and dealerships. We ﬁnd that whenever marginal
revenue is decreasing in the quantities, a Demsetz auction is unambiguously better. Moreover,
a planner who wants to maximize social surplus also prefers a Demsetz auction.
Our point of departure is a standard setting where a principal wants the ﬁnal price of the
good or service to be as low as possible, but agents prefer the monopoly price. The principal
can either run a Demsetz auction for an exclusive contract, or auction two separate contracts to
different agents who then produce perfect substitutes and compete. With a Demsetz auction,
theexpostequilibriumpriceequalsthewinningbid. Bycontrast, whentherearetwocontracts,
the price depends on the outcome of ex post competition. We do not specify the second stage
game, but summarize its outcome as follows: ex ante the equilibrium price is a random vari-
able with an arbitrary distribution F whose support is bounded above by the maximum price
allowed by the contract. In some states of nature agents will succeed in colluding and prices
will be close to the winning bid; in other states agents will compete intensely and prices will be
much lower.4
2This terminology is due to Chadwick (1859).
3In this paper we abstract from complications due to incomplete contracting and asymmetric information.
4There are several interpretations for F. In one of them, it describes agents’ uncertainty about ex post market
2We assume that the principal and the agents are risk neutral. Nevertheless, the main result
of the paper exploits the fact that a Demsetz auction eliminates variability in the equilibrium
price. To get the intuition in a simple setting, assume that the agents’ proﬁts, π, are increasing
and concave in the equilibrium price, and that the principal’s surplus function, S , is decreas-
ingandlinearintheequilibriumprice.5 Considernextwhathappensiftheprincipalsubstitutes
two independent contracts by a Demsetz auction. Clearly, this eliminates the price variability
described by F. And since π is concave in price and the participation constraint always binds,
the price that results from a Demsetz auction must be lower than the average with two agents
andexpostcompetition, i.e., competitionfortheﬁeldleadstolowerpricesthancompetitionin
theﬁeld. Thus, aDemsetzauctionisbetterfortheprincipalwhenhersurplusfunctionislinear.
It is easily seen, as well, that if the surplus function S is sufﬁciently convex, separate contracts
may be better, because then the principal likes price variability. Our main result generalizes
this intuition and shows that a Demsetz auction is unambiguously better when the composi-
tion of the principal’s surplus function and the inverse proﬁt function, S ◦π−1, is strictly con-
cave. Conversely, when this composite function is strictly convex two separate contracts are
unambiguously better.
As in the theory of expected utility, we ﬁnd that this general result is equivalent to a sim-
ple condition that compares the curvatures of the surplus and proﬁt functions. This condition
is quite similar to the necessary and sufﬁcient condition for a utility function to be more risk
averse than the other (Pratt’s [1964] theorem) and makes it easier to compare competition in
the ﬁeld with competition for the ﬁeld. The condition amounts to checking a relation that in-
volves only the ﬁrst and second derivatives of S and π. We illustrate the usefulness of this
condition in the applications section, showing that a Demsetz auction is preferred by the prin-
cipalinallcasesconsidered—procurement,royaltycontracts,dealerships—whenevermarginal
proﬁts are decreasing in quantities.
Our paper is related to the literature of monopoly regulation via franchising which was pio-
neeredbyChadwick(1859)andDemsetz(1968)(seealsoStigler[1968],Posner[1972],Williamson
[1975],RiordanandSappington[1987],Spulber[1989,ch.9],LaffontandTirole[1993,chs.7and
8], Harstad and Crew [1999] and Engel, Fischer and Galetovic [2001, 2004]). We extend this lit-
conditions and potential collusive prices. In another, ﬁrms always collude at the price that maximizes joint proﬁts,
but there is a positive probability of a successful antitrust case against them, leading to a price equal to marginal
costs. Similarly,inthespeciﬁccaseofdealerships,theupstreamﬁrmmaytrytopreventthedoublemarginalization
associated with collusion by penalizing those agreements between franchisors that are detected.
5While we assume that proﬁt and surplus functions are linear in money (that is, they are risk neutral in money
terms), neither the agents’ proﬁt function nor the principal’s surplus function need, in general, be linear in the
equilibriumprice,i.e.,theyareriskaverse(orloving)inprices. Forexample,proﬁtfunctionsaretypicallyquasicon-
cave in price. By contrast, when the agent is a planner who wants to maximize consumer surplus, the principal’s
objective function is convex in prices.
3erature by studying Demsetz auctions in contexts where imperfect competition “in the ﬁeld” is
a feasible alternative to a standard Demsetz auction.
Theapplicationswestudysuggestthatourpaperisalsorelatedtotheliteratureonthe“dou-
ble marginalization” problem in monopoly pricing (see Spengler [1950] for the seminal con-
tribution and Tirole [1988, ch. 4] for a review of the literature). Our result implies that when
marginal revenue is decreasing in the quantity sold and downstream competition is imperfect,
auctioning an exclusive contract is better than relying on ex post imperfect competition.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the general model and
prove the main result of the paper. In section 3 we apply this general result to study four appli-
cations. Section 4 concludes and is followed by a brief appendix.
2 General model and main result
A risk neutral principal wants to contract the production of a good at two plants or locations.6
Outputfromoneplantisaperfectsubstitutefortheoutputoftheother. Iftheequilibriumprice
is p, an agent producing at one plant makes proﬁts π(p), with π0(p) > 0 for p ∈ [p,pm), where
π(p)=0 and pm =argmaxp π(p). Furthermore, π0(pm)=0 and π00(pm)<0. On the other hand,
the principal’s surplus is S (p) if agents charge p, with S 0(p) < 0. Hence there is a conﬂict of
interest: while agents would like to increase prices up to pm, the principal wants the price to be
as low as possible.
The principal may award both plants jointly (J), so that they are run by one agent; or sep-
arately (S), so that two agents run one plant each and compete. The principal auctions both
contracts. When both plants are awarded jointly, the winning bid is denoted by pJ and per-
plant proﬁts for the agent are equal to π(pJ).7 On the other hand, when plants are awarded
to different agents, the minimum winning bid, common across plants, is denoted by pS. In
this case agents are uncertain both about whether they will be able to collude,8 and if they do,
about the price above p at which they will collude.9 We assume that each agent serves half the
demand at a common equilibrium price p, and denote by F(p) the cdf with support [p,pS] that
describes their common beliefs about the realization of this price.10
Wemaketheessentialassumptionthatex-anteexpectedgrossproﬁtsperplantunderajoint
or a separate auction are the same, that is
6All that follows extends trivially to the case of n locations.
7We assume pJ ≤ pm and π(pm)>0.
8Caillaud and Tirole (2001) consider this possibility in the context of essential facilities.
9That is, we assume that prices are such that agents do not lose money ex post, since π(p)=0.
10Competitioninpracticeisgenerallyneitherstaticnorsymmetric. Weavoidcomplicationsbyconcentratingon
stationary equilibria and we use symmetry due to the lack of consensus on how to model collusion in asymmetric
games.
4Condition 1 Z pS
p
π(p)dF(p)=π(pJ)=u+I,
where u is the agent’s reservation utility and I stands for any sunk setup cost. There exist many
agents that could produce the good, all of them with the same value of (u+I).
Condition 1 implies that beneﬁts for agents are independent of whether the principal auc-
tionsproductionatbothplantsjointlyorseparately. Or,inthestandardguiseofprincipal-agent
theory, Condition 1 is the participation constraint that the principal must obey. Note also that
if F(p) is degenerate, Condition 1 implies that under separate auctions the price will be pJ, so
thatjointandseparateauctionsareidentical. Weruleoutthispossibilitybyassumptioninwhat
follows.
Whenplantsareawardedjointly,theprincipal’sbeneﬁtisdenotedWJ ≡S (pJ). Ontheother
hand, when when they are awarded separately, the principal’s expected beneﬁt depends on the
distribution of collusive prices F and equals
WS ≡
Z pS
p
S (p)dF(p).
Fromtheassumptionswemadeonπ,itfollowsthatπ−1 :[π(p),π(pm)]→[p,pm]iswelldeﬁned,
increasing and convex. We then have the following central result of the paper:
Proposition 2 If S ◦π−1 is strictly concave, then WJ > WS. If S ◦π−1 is strictly convex, then
WS >WJ.
Proof. We consider the case where S ◦π−1 is concave. The case where it is convex is analogous.
We have:
WS ≡
Z pS
p
S (p)dF(p)
=
Z pS
p
S ◦π−1[π(p)]dF(p)
< S ◦π−1
"Z pS
p
π(p)dF(p)
#
= S ◦π−1[π(pJ)]
= S (pJ)
≡ WJ,
where the inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality, our assumption that F is not degenerate,
and the identity after the inequality from Condition 1.
5A surprising feature of this result is that we have not imposed any condition on the distribu-
tion of possible collusive outcomes F. Hence, in order to compare joint and separate auctions,
it is sufﬁcient to examine the ‘primitive’ functions π, and S , and one can ignore the exact spec-
iﬁcation of the ex post game between the agents.
This result depends crucially on Condition 1, which ensures that softer competition when
the participation constraint becomes more demanding (that is, ¯ u +I increases). In the case of
joint production, this means softer competition for the franchise, while in the case of separate
production it means less competition between both agents after they begin producing.
The following example illustrates that the welfare implications of the choice between joint
and separate auctions can be important.
Example 1 (An example with conjectural variations11) Demand is given by q =1−p, and pro-
duction and investment costs are zero. We consider a duopoly model with constant symmetrical
conjectural variations, parameterized by r ∼U[−1,1], i.e., the ﬁrms do not know if they will be
abletocolludeatthemonopolylevel,r =1,competealaBertrand,r =−1orCournotr =0;orany
intermediatepossibility.12 Thesolutiontotheduopolyproblemis qi =1/(3+r), p =(1+r)/(3+r).
Given the distribution of r, the distribution of prices is F(p)= p/(1−p), in the range [0,1/2].
Assume ﬁrst that pS =1/2. Since proﬁts for each ﬁrm are πi = p(1−p)/2, we have
E(π(pS =1/2))=
Z 1/2
0
π(p)dF(p)=
Z 1/2
0
p(1−p)
2
µ
1
1−p
¶2
dp =−
1
4
+
1
2
log(2).
Since we must have the same proﬁts per plant for condition 1 to hold, pJ(1−pJ)/2 = E(π(pS))
implies that pJ = (1−
p
3−4ln(2))/2. In order to make a welfare comparison, recall that social
welfare is the sum of producer and consumer surplus, W(p)=(1−p2)/2. Hence we have to com-
pare E(W(pS)) and W(pJ). Now
E(W(pS =1/2))=
Z 1/2
0
1−p2
2
µ
1
1−p
¶2
dp =
Z 1/2
0
1+p
2(1−p)
dp =−
1
4
+log(2)=.4431
and W(pJ) =
p
3−4ln(2)/4+log(2)/2 = .4658, so W(pJ)/E(W(pS)) = 1.051, which shows the
difference in welfare in the two situations.
In the general case of the auction leading to pS ∈ [0,1/2], we assume that the behavior in the
case of two ﬁrms is still governed by the original distribution of r, and that values of r which
would have led to prices higher than pS would make the ﬁrms use the highest possible price,
12In this example we use conjectural variations as a simplifying device that enables us to consider the full range
of competitive outcomes using the variation of a single parameter.
6i.e., pS. In that case, the distribution has a strictly positive weight at pS, and we can rewrite the
calculations for general pS:13
E(π(pS)) =
Z pS
0
π(p)dF(p) +
pS(1−pS)
2
(1−F(pS))
=
Z pS
0
p(1−p)
2
µ
1
1−p
¶2
dp +
pS(1−pS)
2
(1−2pS)
1−pS
= −p2
S −
1
2
log(1−pS).
Figure 1: Percentage difference between WJ and WS as a function of pS in example 1.
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Inthiscase,sincewemusthavethesameproﬁtsperplantforcondition1tohold, pJ(1−pJ)/2=
E(π(pS), so that pJ =
³
1−
q
1+8p2
S +4log(1−pS)
´
/2. Now
E(W(pS)) =
Z pS
0
1−p2
2
µ
1
1−p
¶2
dp +
1−p2
S
2
1−2pS
1−pS
=
Z pS
0
1+p
2
dp +
(1+pS)(1−2pS)
2
=
1
2
−pS −p2
S −log(1−pS).
and
W(pJ) =
1
4
−p2
S −
1
2
log(1−pS)−
q
1+8p2
S +4log(1−pS).
The ratio W(pJ)/E(W(pS)) ≥ 1,∀p ∈ [0,1/2], with a value one at pS = 0, and a maximum
value slightly above 5%, as can be seen in Figure 1.
The following result provides a simple characterization for the concavity of S ◦π−1.
13Alternatively, we could have assumed that the distribution of r adjusts to the reduced range provided by the
interval [0,pS], but this would not alter the conclusions of the example.
7Proposition 3 A necessary and sufﬁcient condition for S ◦π−1 to be concave is that
S 00
S 0 >
π00
π0 (1)
for all p ∈ [p,pm). Since, by assumption, π0 > 0 and S 0 < 0 in the relevant range, equation (1) is
equivalent to
S 00π0 <S 0π00. (2)
Moreover, the converse of condition (1) is necessary and sufﬁcient for S ◦π−1 to be convex.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 1 If π is strictly concave, then the concavity of S is sufﬁcient for a joint contract to be
better than two separate contracts.
We can use Proposition 3 and Figures 2 and 3 to examine the intuition underlying our main
result. Suppose that S is linear, π strictly concave, two separate contracts are auctioned, and in
equilibriump cantakeonlytwovalues, p andpm,withequalprobability. Inthiscaseeachagent
makes expected proﬁts equal to 1
2π(p)+ 1
2π(pm) = 1
2π(pm) and the principal’s surplus equals
1
2S (p)+ 1
2S (pm) (see Figure 2). Since S is linear and π concave, Proposition 2 holds, and a
joint auction is better than a separate auction. Why? Condition 1 implies that 1
2π(pm) = π(pJ).
As is straightforward from Figure 2a, concavity of π implies that pJ < 1
2p + 1
2pm. Hence the
principal obtains a lower average price with a joint auction.14 Because in this example S is
linear, 1
2S (p)+ 1
2S (pm)=S (1
2p+ 1
2pm)<S (pJ) (see Figure 3b). Note that the same reasoning
applies to any probability distribution F with support in the interval [p,pm].
It can now easily be seen why strict concavity of S is sufﬁcient for a joint auction to be
better when π is concave. Eliminating variability in p is an added bonus for the principal, since
ES (p) < S (Ep) for all distributions F. Conversely, when S is convex, a separate auction may
(but need not) be better. Figure 3 depicts exactly the same case as Figure 2, except that S is
convex, so that now the principal likes price variability. For the particular distribution depicted
in this ﬁgure, the principal is indifferent between a joint and a separate auction. Essentially,
the gain of a lower expected price p attained with a joint auction is exactly offset by the fall in
the expected surplus due to lower price variability. With S sufﬁciently convex and for a given
14This can be put in the more standard terms of principal–agent theory. From Condition 1 it follows that the
agent’s participation constraint is 1
2π(pm) = π(pJ). Since π is concave, the average price that the agent requires in
order to participate is lower with a joint contract, which eliminates risk.
8Figure2: Intuitionunderlyingthemainresult: WhenS islinear, ajointauctionisalwaysbetter.
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9Figure 3: Intuition underlying the main result: When S is convex, anything goes.




p
p
π
S
p
p
pJ
pJ
pm
pm
(p +pm)/2
(p +pm)/2
S(pm)
S(p)
π(pm)
π(pJ)= 1
2π(pm)
S(pJ)
(a)
(b)
10π, the gains from a lower expected price are outweighed by the utility loss which stems from
losing “high” surpluses.
3 Applications
In this section we use Proposition 2 to study three canonical applications: procurement (the
principal buys the production of the plants), dealerships (agents buy an input from the princi-
pal and incur some costs to transform and resell it) and royalties (the principal receives a ﬁxed
fee per unit sold by the agent without engaging in production). In these cases functions S and
π can be derived from standard demand and cost functions.
In all the cases that follow we assume that the value of the marginal unit at q is P(q), with
P0 < 0. We also assume that the inverse function of P, P−1(p) ≡ D(p) is well deﬁned in the
appropriate range. Obviously D0 <0. Agent i incurs in total cost c(qi) when producing qi units
of output at a given plant, with c0 >0 and c00 ≥0.15
We ﬁnd that in all three cases a sufﬁcient condition for a joint contract to be better for the
principal is that marginal revenue be decreasing in quantities. In addition, we show that when-
ever this holds, a social planner also prefers a joint auction. The following two lemmas, which
are proven in the appendix, will be useful when establishing this result:
Lemma 1 (i)P0(q)= 1
D0(P(q));(ii)P00(q)=−
D00(P(q))
{D0(P(q))}3;(iii)D0(p)= 1
P0(D(p));(iv)D00(p)=−
P00(D(p))
{P0(D(p))}3.
Lemma 2 2P0(q)+qP00(q)<0 if and only if DD00−2(D0)2 <0.
3.1 Procurement
We ﬁrst consider ﬁxed-price procurement.16 The principal wants to buy an input as cheaply
as possible, and can choose between one or two suppliers. Clearly, the principal cares (di-
rectly) only about the price p paid per unit, and not about production costs c (of course, as
in any principal-agent problem, the principal cares about the agents’ costs indirectly through
the participation constraint). Hence S (p) ≡
R ∞
p D(s)ds is the principal’s surplus, and π(p) =
1
2pD(p)−c
³
D(p)
2
´
is the surplus of each agent with a separate auction; with a joint auction
15Thisconditionimpliesnolossofgenerality. Ifc00 <0,marginalandaveragecostsaredecreasingandauctioning
jointly is clearly better.
16In ﬁxed-price procurement contracts, the buyer and the seller agree on a price, and the seller assumes all cost
risk. At the other extreme, in a cost-plus contract the buyer reimburses the seller’s cost. As argued in Laffont and
Tirole (1993, p. 662), only ﬁxed-price contracts are relevant when it is too costly for the buyer to audit the subcost
of the supplier.
11the agent’s surplus is 2π(p). In this case pm = argmax
n
1
2pD(p)−c
³
D(p)
2
´o
and p is such that
1
2pD(p)−c
³D(p)
2
´
=0. Therefore
S 0 = −D <0,
S 00 = −D0 >0
(i.e. S is convex and Corollary 1 does not apply). Also,
π0 =
1
2
[D +(p −c0)D0],
which we assume strictly positive for p ∈[p,pm), and
π00 =
1
2
·
(p −c0)D00+2D0−
1
2
(D0)2c00
¸
.
Applying Propositions 2 and 3 to this case, the following result follows:
Proposition 4 A sufﬁcient condition for WJ >WS is that
2P0+qP00 <0, (3)
that is, that marginal revenue be decreasing in q.
Proof. Since in the relevant range we have S 0 < 0 and π0 > 0, it follows from Proposition 3 that
it sufﬁces to show that (3) ensures that
S 00π0 <S 0π00 (4)
for all p ∈[p, pm). Some straightforward calculations show that (4) is equivalent to:
(p −c0)[D00D −2(D0)2]<−2π0D0+
1
2
(D0)2Dc00. (5)
Lemma 2 implies that the left hand side of (5) is negative for all p ∈ [p,pm] if marginal revenue
is decreasing in q. On the other hand, the right hand side of (5) is positive, because c00 ≥ 0 and
π0 >0 for all p ∈[p,pm).
123.2 Royalties
Consider a licensing agreement where the licensee pays the principal a royalty t per unit pro-
duced and sold, but no ﬁxed fee.17 For example, this is the case when a patent holder licences
the right to manufacture the good, but does not participate in the product market.18 In this
case the principal is worried about downstream double marginalization, and, given t, would
like the licensee to sell as much as possible. The principal’s surplus is S (p) = tD(p) (where
now D is market demand for the good), and π(p) = 1
2(p −t)D(p)−c(D(p)/2) is the surplus of
each licensee.
We then have that Proposition 4 also applies, i.e. 2P0+qP00 <0 is sufﬁcient for WJ >WS. We
postpone the proof until the next subsection.
As is well known, a disadvantage of licensing through royalties is that any market power
exercised downstream reduces industry proﬁts (this is the double marginalization problem).
One solution is to auction off the monopoly for a ﬁxed fee and charge no royalty.19 In that
case, the principal does not want competition downstream. When ﬁxed lump-sum fees are
not feasible, the patent holder must make her income through royalties. But then the double
marginalization problem bites, and controlling market power downstream becomes an issue.
Our result implies that decreasing marginal revenue is sufﬁcient for a Demsetz auction (ex ante
competition) to be better than ex post competition when ex post market structure is uncertain.
One could argue that an exclusive contract with a two part tariff is enough to prevent the
double marginalization problem. Note, however, that to choose the right ﬁxed fee the principal
must know the demand curve. Our analysis implies that when marginal revenue is decreasing
in quantities a joint franchise solves the problem.
3.3 Dealerships
Dealerships are similar to licensing, except that the principal’s cost increases with the number
of units sold. For example, consider the case of car dealerships. Cars are provided by the man-
ufacturer at a ﬁxed price and the dealers are free (within limits set by list price of the manufac-
turer) to bargain their markup with clients. The question for the manufacturer then is whether
to have dealerships that are, say, spatially close and thus compete with each other, or to have
one dealer with a cap on the resale price.20
17Calvert (1964) and Taylor and Silberston (1973) observe that about 50% of all licensing contracts specify royal-
ties only. Also, Lafontaine and Shaw (1999) show that, on average, franchise fees amount to no more than 8% of
actual payouts from franchise holders to franchisees.
18See Tirole (1988, ch. 10.8) for a review of the literature on licensing.
19See Gallini (1984) and Katz and Shapiro (1985).
20We abstract from other important considerations in these contracts, such as service quality.
13Assume that ˜ c(q) is the principal’s cost function, with ˜ c0, ˜ c00 > 0. Then S (p) = tD(p)−
˜ c(D(p)), and, as with licensing, π(p)= 1
2(p −t)D(p)−c(D(p)/2). Then:21
S 0 = (t − ˜ c0)D0,
S 00 = (t − ˜ c0)D00−(D0)2˜ c00;
and
π0 =
1
2
[D +(p −t −c0)D0],
π00 =
1
2
[D0+
µ
1−
c00D0
2
¶
D0+(p −t −c0)D00].
We now show that 2P0+qP00 < 0 is again sufﬁcient for WJ > WS. As before, since π0 > 0 for all
p ∈ [p,pm), it follows, after some straightforward but tedious algebra, that S 00π0 < S 0π00 for all
p ∈[p,pm) is equivalent to
DD00−2(D0)2 <2π0(D0)2˜ c00
(t − ˜ c0)
−
1
2
(D0)3c00, (6)
which holds because the right hand side is (obviously) positive, while the left hand side is neg-
ative because of Lemma 2.
3.4 The social planner
Next, we consider the case of a social planner who wants to contract for the provision of a ser-
vice. As an example, consider highway franchises. In many developing countries roads are
being franchised to private ﬁrms. In exchange for toll revenue, the franchise holder ﬁnances,
builds, operates and maintains the road.22 In some cases roads are natural monopolies, and
are awarded to the ﬁrm offering to charge the lowest toll. Nevertheless, when there is more
than one way to get from one point to another, as is often the case in large cities, different roads
could be awarded to different franchise holders.23 Should the regulator award all franchises to
the same ﬁrm or award several highway franchises and let them compete? Another example is
the auction of the rights to provide local telephony in rural areas, where the auction is based
21Note that royalties corresponds to the case where ˜ c ≡0.
22See Engel, Fischer and Galetovic (2001b) for a discussion of highway franchising.
23One example is the La Dormida project in Chile, which would compete with Route 68, the highway that cur-
rently joins Chile’s capital, Santiago, with the port of Valparaíso. The Ministry of Public Works weighed the beneﬁts
of joint and separate auctions.
14on the price of a standard local call. Is it better to have a single company provide the service or
would it be better to allocate two companies to the area?
In this case the principal cares about social surplus (i.e. consumer and producer surplus) so
that S (p)=
R ∞
p D(s)ds+pD(p)−2c
³
D(p)
2
´
;and π(p)= 1
2pD(p)−c
h
D(p)
2
i
. Then
S 0 = (p −c0)D0,
S 00 = (p −c0)D00+D0−
1
2
(D0)2c00,
and π0, π00 are the same as in the case of dealerships (with t =0). Condition (1) now leads to
(p −c0)D00+D0− 1
2(D0)2c00
(p −c0)D0 >
(p −c0)D00+2D0− 1
2(D0)2c00
D +(p −c0)D0 ,
which, after some algebra yields
(p −c0)
£
DD00−2(D0)2¤
<−2π0D0+
1
2
(D0)2Dc00, (7)
which is the same condition as in the case of procurement. Hence, again decreasing marginal
revenue is sufﬁcient for WJ >WS.
Finally, we present a concrete example which suggests that welfare gains may be important
when using a Demsetz auction instead of separate auctions.
Example We use the notation and deﬁnitions from the preceding subsection and assume
D(p) = 1−p, c(q) = c0. We also assume that the separate and joint auction of both franchises
dissipate all rents.24 Since S 0(p)=−D(p)= p −1 and π(p)= p(1−p)−c0, we have that π00/π0 <
S 00/S 0 if and only if −2/(1−2p)<−1/(1−p) for all p < pm =1/2, which indeed holds. It follows
that the sufﬁcient condition for Proposition 2 is satisﬁed.
Assume that the ex-ante distribution of market structure outcomes in the case of separate
franchises F is a point distribution with weights of 1/2 on collusion at the bid price and 1/2 on
price competition with price equal to marginal cost (zero). Then pJ is the smallest solution to
p(1−p) = c0 while pS is the smallest solution to 1
2p(1−p) = c0. The existence of a solution in
both cases requires c0 <1/8. Then:
WJ −WS =
1
2
(1−pJ)2−
1
4
©
(1−pS)2+1
ª
=
1
8
h
2
p
1−4c0−1−
p
1−8c0
i
>0, ∀c0 >0,
Furthermore, in this example a joint auction can lead to a welfare increase as large as 17%.
24Thus the common value of both expressions in Condition 1 is zero.
154 Conclusion
We have shown a simple condition for a principal to prefer to contract the provision of a good
from a single agent via a Demsetz auction, rather than by having multiple agents provide the
good under (imperfectly) competitive conditions. In the canonical cases of procurement, roy-
altycontractsanddealerships,decreasingmarginalrevenueensuresthataDemsetzauction(ex
ante competition) is better for the principal than ex post competition. This result is surprising,
because it is independent of the expected intensity of ex post competition.
The results in this paper do not necessarily imply an endorsement of monopolies, since
many relevant factors were left out of our analysis. First, we assumed a single service quality,
which can be veriﬁed at no cost, even though in most cases quality will be worse in the absence
of competition. Second, we ignored political economy and asymmetric information consider-
ations, which may be worse when a regulator deals with a monopoly. Third, we rule out in-
complete contracting and the hold-up problem. For example, a manufacturer might prefer to
have competing dealers in order to avoid a bilateral monopoly. Finally, we have not considered
the possibility of technical change in the delivery of franchise services, a factor that if present
makes competition more desirable if it accelerates the introduction of new technologies.
On the other hand, there are some aspects we left out which strengthen the case for a joint
auction. First, if agents are risk averse, the preference for joint auctions increases. More impor-
tantly, we have assumed that a joint contract does not lead to any cost savings; or, conversely,
that ex post competition, which implies more than one agent, does not lead to (ﬁxed) cost du-
plication. A common concern when formerly monopolistic markets are liberalized is that com-
petition may lead to inefﬁcient cost duplication through “excessive” entry.25 With a Demsetz
auction, however, cost duplication is no longer an issue. Our result indicates that an exclusive
contract may be preferable even when it does not prevent ﬁxed-cost duplication.
25See, for example, Armstrong (2000).
16Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 2
Differentiating both sides of π◦π−1(p)= p leads to:
(π−1)0(p)=
1
π0(π−1(p))
. (8)
Hence:
(S ◦π−1)0(p)=S 0(π−1(p))(π−1)0(p)=
S 0(π−1(p))
π0(π−1(p))
. (9)
Differentiating both sides of (8) with respect to p and using (9) leads to:
(S ◦π−1)00(p)=
S 00π0−S 0π00
(π0)3 ,
where all terms on the r.h.s. are evaluated at π−1(p). Since π0 > 0 this implies that S ◦π−1 is
concave if and only if S 00π0 < S 0π00. And since S 0 < 0 and π0 > 0 we conclude that π00/π0 <
S 00/S 0 is necessary and sufﬁcient for concavity of S ◦π−1. The result now follows.
B Proof of Lemma 2
To prove (i) and (ii) totally differentiate the identity q ≡D[P(q)] with respect to q to obtain
1=D0P0,
from which (i) follows. Next, totally differentiate P0(q)≡ 1
D0[P(q)] with respect to q to obtain
P00 =−
D00
(D0)2P0,
from which (ii) follows by substituting 1
D0 for P0. The proof of (iii) and (iv) is analogous and we
omit it.
C Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Sufﬁciency: use (i) and (ii) in Lemma 1 to substitute for P0 and P00. Necessity: use (iii)
and (iv) to substitute for D, D0 and D00.
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